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“CAUSE I AIN’T GOT NO PENCIL”: A CALL FOR
CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOL FUNDING
LITIGATION REFORM
I woke myself up
Because we ain’t got an alarm clock
Dug in the dirty clothes basket,
Cause ain’t nobody washed my uniform
Brushed my hair and teeth in the dark,
Cause the lights ain’t on
Even got my baby sister ready,
Cause my mama wasn’t home.
Got us both to school on time,
To eat us a good breakfast.
Then when I got to class the teacher fussed
Cause I ain’t got no pencil.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Malcolm X once described poverty and poor education as a vicious
cycle.2 Poverty is ubiquitous as it is both the result and the cause of an
inferior education. In the United States, we tend to deify freedom,
even though the country was built on slavery. That same irony persists
because minority children are left with an adequate education instead
of an equal education, and they are ultimately forced into this vicious
cycle of poverty. The quality of education a person receives directly
affects her economic status.3 When students experience the visceral
stress of poverty, to the extent of not even owning a pencil to do their
1. Talia Richman, Viral Poem, ‘Cause I Ain’t Got a Pencil,’ Was Not Written by a Baltimore
Student, BALT. SUN (Feb. 13, 2018, 10:55 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/features/balti
more-insider-blog/bs-md-ci-cause-i-aint-got-a-pencil-20180213-story.html (describing the origins
of the poem).
2. Isaac Legend, Malcolm X on the Very Vicious Cycle of Poverty, YOUTUBE (Aug. 21, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8YGITrPMuc (quoting Malcolm X: “When you live in a
poor neighborhood, you are living in an area where you have to have poor schools. When you
have poor schools, you have poor teachers. When you have poor teachers, you get a poor educa-
tion. When you get a poor education, you can only work in a poor-paying job. And that poor-
paying job enables you to live again in a poor neighborhood. So it’s a very vicious cycle”).
3. John F. Watson, The Cause, Effect and Constitutional Consequence of Unequal Funding:
Public Education in Illinois, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 399, 402 (1993).
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work, it becomes essential for public school funding to be specifically
altered to meet those dire needs.4
Recently, in Board of Education v. Rauner, the plaintiff filed claims
of discrimination against the government regarding the allocation of
funds to public schools throughout the State of Illinois.5 Chicago Pub-
lic Schools (CPS) is the only school district in Illinois required to pay
teachers’ pensions instead of the State, and in turn, it is the only dis-
trict in Illinois that has a student population comprised of over 90%
minority students.6 The extra burden of paying teacher pensions in
CPS has aggravated its debt accumulation.7 As a result, CPS has been
forced to redirect its funds even further away from students.8 This dis-
crepancy in funding has caused school closures, and for the schools
that remain open it has resulted in a second-class education for the
Black and Hispanic students in CPS.9 However, public school funding
litigation has been struck down relentlessly regardless of the analysis
brought forth.
It is time for the judiciary to retire the archaic ideology of an ade-
quate education and place more weight on the stark impact of discrim-
ination on minority children in its analysis. This Note makes two
assertions: (1) The Circuit Court of Cook County misapplied the dis-
parate impact analysis in Board of Education v. Rauner in general;
and (2) the analysis for public school funding litigation should be al-
tered to heavily scrutinize the starkness of the impact created because
of the vulnerable class of plaintiffs affected and to balance the stark-
ness against the defendants’ proffered explanation for their discrimi-
natory policy.
This Note will examine the insufficient application of the analysis in
public school funding litigation in CPS by analyzing the Rauner case.
Ineffective public school funding litigation precipitates the risk of pov-
4. Effects of Poverty, Hunger and Homelessness on Children and Youth, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N,
https://www.apa.org/pi/families/poverty.aspx (select the “Poverty” drop-down menu) (last visited
Dec. 5, 2017).
5. Bd. of Educ. v. Rauner, No. 2017 CH 2157, 2017 WL 2407356, at *1–4 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017).
6. Id. at *2–3; Matt Masterson, Teachers’ Pension Fund Not Expecting Full CPS Payment by
Friday Deadline, WTTW NEWS (June 27, 2017, 5:09 PM), https://news.wttw.com/2017/06/27/
teachers-pension-fund-not-expecting-full-cps-payment-friday-deadline.
7. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *3–4; Verified Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judg-
ment, Permanent Injunction, and Other Relief at ¶¶ 6–16, Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356 (No. 2017
CH 02157), https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CPS-Funding.pdf.
8. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *3–4 (indicating CPS’s need to cut school programs in order
to make its required payments to the pension fund).
9. Id. at *2; Juan Perez Jr. & Jennifer Smith Richards, More Than a Dozen Chicago High
Schools Struggle to Survive as Enrollment Plummets, Performance Falters, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 30,
2017, 7:22 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-met-chicago-schools-enrollment-de
cline-20171129-story.html.
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erty for minority students because of the acceptance of the ideology of
an “adequate” education and the refusal of the judiciary to remedy
this error. Funding for all schools must, regardless of race, have an
infrastructure founded on equity. The vehicle to ensure equal funding
is the judicial system. The judiciary can no longer sit by and allow this
systemic discrimination to prodigiously handicap students of color.
The application of disparate impact scrutiny in public school funding
litigation is essential to ending this vicious cycle of poverty and low-
quality education. Therefore, it is essential that courts emphasize the
starkness of the disparate impact created by the discriminatory policy,
in its determination of liability.
Part II of this Note provides a background on the three major issues
of public school funding reform, including: (1) the theory that an ade-
quate education is equivalent to an equal education, (2) the lack of
judicial activism in education litigation, and (3) the perpetual under-
stating of the discriminatory impact in the application of public school
funding litigation. Part III of this Note will continue by analyzing the
Board of Education v. Rauner opinion and how the disparate impact
theory of liability was applied sparingly. Part IV of this Note will ana-
lyze how the judiciary must (1) reject an adequate education, (2) rec-
ognize the importance of judicial activism in this scope, and (3)
accentuate the starkness of a discriminatory impact in the analysis of
public school funding litigation by replacing the burden-shifting test
with a balancing test. This Part also reapplies Swan’s disparate impact
analysis to the Rauner case. Part V of this Note will conclude by dis-
cussing the impact of public school funding litigation reform and its
deep-rooted connection to poverty.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part will discuss the origins of an adequate education in com-
parison to an equal education in the scope of public school funding
litigation. Next, this Part will explain the history of judicial activism in
education litigation in Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar.10
Finally, this Part will describe the necessity for the courts to empha-
size the large discriminatory discrepancy in public school funding liti-
gation. The litigation that evaluates the distribution of funding in
public education throughout Illinois remains problematic because of
these ancient doctrines.
10. 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996).
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A. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez:
The Importance of an Adequate Education
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez is the seminal
case of public school funding litigation.11 In Rodriguez, the amount of
money per pupil in Texas school districts was primarily funded by the
property taxes in that specific district.12 This method resulted in vast
disparities in funding between affluent districts and poor districts.13
The State spent $594 per pupil in the wealthier districts, which con-
sisted of 20% minority students.14 The State spent an estimated $356
per pupil in the less affluent districts, which consisted of over 96%
minority students.15 The plaintiffs argued that public school funding
that resulted in inter-district spending disparities violated the Four-
teenth Amendment because it provided the students who lived in cer-
tain neighborhoods with a lower quality of education.16
The Supreme Court of the United States stated that “education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments.”17 Education is important to a democratic society because “[i]t
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibili-
ties[, and] . . . [i]t is the very foundation of good citizenship.”18 The
Court emphasized that any child who is expected to succeed in life
must have an adequate opportunity to an education.19 Even though
the Court recognized the importance of education, it held that the ju-
diciary is not a legislative body. Therefore, the Court cannot pick
human activities and label them as fundamental rights in order to af-
ford them additional protection.20 The Court proclaimed its duty was
only to recognize already established constitutional rights.21 The
plaintiffs argued that education is connected to other constitutional
rights, such as the right to free speech and the right to vote, and in
turn, that it should fall under the penumbra of constitutional protec-
tion.22 Despite this argument, the Court held that there was no explicit
or implicit protection for education in the Constitution.23
11. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
12. Id. at 6–7.
13. Id. at 11–17.
14. Id. at 12–14.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 22.
17. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
18. Id. at 30.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 31.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 35.
23. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-3\DPL306.txt unknown Seq: 5 29-MAY-19 17:00
2019] “CAUSE I AIN’T GOT NO PENCIL” 705
Following precedent, the Court also ruled that only complete depri-
vation of education implicates constitutional protection and triggers
the Court to rule on education and indigence.24 Here, the lack of
funding for a certain school district, regardless of the dominance of
certain races or wealth, “has not occasioned an absolute deprivation
of the desired benefit.”25 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that “the
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or pre-
cisely equal advantages” in education.26 Thus, the Court does not re-
quire equal education for students under the Equal Protection Clause,
but instead the Court held that an adequate education will suffice.
According to the Court, Texas provided its students with an ade-
quate education by offering twelve years of free education, books,
teachers, and transportation.27 Therefore, the Court found that educa-
tion is not protected under the Fourteenth Amendment for those who
live in districts with less taxable property wealth, and the Constitution
only requires that all students receive an adequate education—not an
equal education.28
B. Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar: Judicial Activism
in Interpreting an Adequate Education
In Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, public school funding
was allocated from property taxes and “various federal, state and local
sources.”29 Under Illinois’s “financing scheme, vast differences in edu-
cational resources and opportunities exist[ed] among the State’s
school districts.”30 The plaintiffs claimed that the disparities in funding
and resources meant that children living in districts with lower prop-
erty wealth received inadequate educations in comparison to students
living in districts with higher property wealth.31 The plaintiffs re-
quested a declaratory judgment, namely that the Governor and the
state superintendent violated the state constitution by providing stu-
24. Id. at 23–24. In its reasoning, the Court looked to precedent to show that heightened
scrutiny is required where “because of their impecunity [individuals] were completely unable to
pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a
meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.” Id. at 21. Specifically, the Court in its analysis
cited to the following cases: Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); and Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
Id. at 21–23.
25. Id. at 23.
26. Id. at 24.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 23–24, 28.
29. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (Ill. 1996).
30. Id. at 1182.
31. Id.
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dents with a low-quality education due to the public school funding
scheme.32
The defendants asserted that adequacy in educational funding and
opportunity is analogous to equality in funding and opportunity and
that a district’s property wealth should be “educationally irrelevant”
as a consideration for the amount of resources granted.33 The plain-
tiffs rebutted that if a district’s property wealth is high, then the
amount of taxes used to support the school district will be high.34
Therefore, students in a district with higher property taxes will receive
more funding. The more funding a district receives, the greater the
number of teachers with master’s degrees and more teaching experi-
ence the district can hire because the district can afford to offer higher
salaries.35 The increase in school funding would add extra value be-
cause it would allow these districts to offer broader course offerings.36
However, the court ruled that adequacy should be defined in terms
of “various specific substantive educational goals” rather than based
on the amount of money districts receive in comparison to one an-
other.37 Plaintiffs argued that funding should provide a minimum level
of education to equip students so that they become good citizens and
competitors in the labor market.38 The court reasoned that it did not
matter that some schools exceeded efficiency and some did not.39 The
framers of the funding policy were aware of the disparities at the time
they were produced by the local property tax funding system.40 De-
spite this, the court still felt that this funding system would be enough
to provide an adequate education. Therefore, the court ruled that effi-
ciency had been established and no violation occurred.41 The court
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1184. The term “efficiency” is used in Edgar to describe the state constitution educa-
tional standard, and this term is analogous to the term “adequacy” that is used throughout this
Note—meaning less than an equal education.
34. See id. at 1181 (“Obviously, the amount which a school district is able to raise through
property taxes is determined by the taxable property wealth within the district. Wealthy dis-
tricts—those with substantial taxable property wealth per pupil—are able to raise more revenue
per pupil at a given tax rate than poor districts.”); id. at 1182 (“During the 1989–90 school year,
the average tax base in the wealthiest 10% of elementary schools was over 13 times the average
tax base in the poorest 10%. For high school and unit school districts, the ratios of the average
tax bases in the wealthiest and poorest districts were 8.1 to 1 and 7 to 1, respectively, during the
1989–90 school year.”).
35. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1182.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1188.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1188.
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reasoned that this “efficiency” standard would stand because the Illi-
nois Constitution required an efficient education, not an equal one.42
Also in Edgar, the court held that “[w]hat constitutes a ‘high qual-
ity’ education, and how it may best be provided cannot be ascertained
by any judicially discoverable or manageable standards.”43 It instead
reasoned that educational quality is a policy which involves “philo-
sophical and practical considerations” that should be reasoned
through and analyzed by legislators at their discretion.44 The court de-
cided that it should take “an exceedingly limited role in matters relat-
ing to public education, recognizing that educational policy is almost
exclusively within the province of the legislative branch.”45 Therefore,
the court held that it would not “under the guise of constitutional in-
terpretation, presume to lay down guidelines or ultimatums for [the
legislature]” in regard to public school funding.46 This decision to re-
frain from judicial activism in educational litigation is an essential fac-
tor in the stagnancy of public school funding litigation that is still seen
today.
C. Swan v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago:
Disparate Impact
In Rauner, the court followed the Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
disparate impact analysis that requires the plaintiff to show a prima
facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, in-
cluding an adverse harm and a specific policy that created the adverse
harm.47 Like the Title VII analysis, under Title VI the burden of prov-
ing a prima facie case of discrimination is not onerous. The defendant
may rebut it by simply producing some evidence that it had a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for adopting the specific policy that
caused the disparate impact.48 Once the disparate impact has been es-
42. Id. at 1187 (“[T]he framers of the 1970 Constitution viewed educational equality and ‘effi-
ciency’ to be separate and distinct subjects. . . . To ignore this careful and deliberate choice by
interpreting the efficiency requirement as an enforceable guarantee of equality would do vio-
lence to the framers’ understanding of the education article.”).
43. Id. at 1191.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1189.
46. Id. at 1192 (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71, 128 (Wash. 1978)).
47. See Title VI Legal Manual: Section VII: Proving Discrimination – Disparate Impact, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE 11, https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/923556/download (last vis-
ited Apr. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Title VI Legal Manual]; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rauner, No. 2017
CH 2157, 2017 WL 2407356, at *29–32 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017) (describing how the Illinois Civil Rights
Act (ICRA) is the state codification of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that a private
right of action can be brought under ICRA based upon a disparate impact).
48. Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2005).
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tablished by the plaintiff, the defendant must articulate a substantial,
legitimate justification for the policy.49 This is similar to the business
necessity reasoning required in the Title VII analysis, but it differs
because of the broader practices under Title VI.50 Once a justification
is identified, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to determine
whether there were less discriminatory alternatives available for the
defendant.51 The burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff
throughout this analysis.52
In Swan v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, the plaintiffs
filed a claim under the Illinois Civil Rights Act (ICRA) stating that
the city’s closure of forty-nine elementary schools in an effort to ad-
dress reduced student enrollment, decreased revenues, and increased
operating costs was discrimination.53 The plaintiffs claimed that the
harms of the school closures are felt disproportionately by Black stu-
dents and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the schools from
closing.54 The moving party must satisfy three requirements to meet
the threshold for a preliminary injunction.55 Under this test, “[i]f the
party cannot show each of these threshold requirements, the prelimi-
nary injunction must be denied.”56 Here, the court held that the plain-
tiffs failed to prove the third requirement for a preliminary injunction
because they failed to establish that the disparate impact claim would
have a likelihood of success on the merits.57
1. Disparate Impact
To prove a disparate impact under ICRA, the “[p]laintiffs are re-
sponsible for ‘isolating and identifying the specific . . . practices that
are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.’”58
The plaintiffs must establish causation by presenting statistical evi-
dence sufficient to show that the policy or practice at issue is the cause
of the plaintiff’s exclusion because of their membership in a protected
49. Title VI Legal Manual, supra note 47, at 32. R
50. Id. at 33.
51. Id. at 40.
52. Id.
53. Swan v. Bd. of Educ., No. 13 C 3623, 2013 WL 4401439, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013); 740
Ill. Comp. Stat. 23/5 (2010).
54. Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *1, 11.
55. Id. (“First, the party must show that it will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction.
Second, that the traditional legal remedies would be inadequate. And third, that its claim has a
likelihood of success on the merits.”).
56. Id.
57. Id. at *27.
58. Id. at *19 (quoting Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 717 (7th Cir. 2012)).
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group.59 If the plaintiffs meet this initial hurdle, then the burden shifts
to the defendants “to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
[their] actions.”60 Finally, if the defendants can justify their actions,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to “prove the existence of an
‘equally valid and less discriminatory practice’ that [d]efendants re-
fused to use.”61
i. Discriminatory Policy
The Swan plaintiffs argued that the defendant Board’s decision to
close schools based on underutilization led to disproportionately clos-
ing schools with predominantly Black student bodies.62 The city felt
that the buildings and schools were being underutilized because CPS
enrolled only 430,000 students despite the 510,000 available seats.63
The Board defined the utilization rate by dividing a given school’s to-
tal enrollment figure as of the twentieth day of the school year by the
given school’s “ideal capacity.”64 Further, to find the school’s “ideal
capacity,” the first step is to calculate a school’s number of “allotted
homerooms.”65 For this first step, CPS multiplied the number of class-
rooms by 76%.66 For the second step, CPS then multiplies the “allot-
ted homerooms” figure by thirty, resulting in the school’s “ideal
capacity.”67 If a school’s utilization rate was less than 80%, then it was
considered “underutilized,” and if the rate was between 80%–120%,
then the school was considered “efficient.”68 To support their claim of
a disparate impact, the plaintiffs provided that 87% of the students in
the closed schools were Black, while CPS’s total student population
was 40.5% Black.69 The court held that this statistic was insufficient to
establish causation.70
The court reasoned that the statistic proffered by the plaintiffs did
not support their theory of a disparate impact because “the process of
winnowing down the list of 330 underutilized schools to the 49 schools
59. Id.
60. Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *19.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id. at *3.
65. Id.
66. Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *3 (“Seventy-six percent represents the percentage of all class-
rooms used as ‘homerooms’ in a prototype school . . . .”).
67. Id. Thirty is “the number of students in what the Board believed was an efficiently-utilized
classroom.” Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at *19.
70. Id. at *20.
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at issue,” was based on other factors unrelated to utilization.71 This
process included insulating high schools and Level 1 schools from clo-
sure and adopting guiding principles such as: “maintaining higher
quality facilities with a lower cost to maintain, and avoiding the crea-
tion of areas with no neighborhood schools due to distance or other
geographic boundaries, which further decreased the number of
schools eligible for closure.”72 The court stressed that because of these
other principles used to determine closures, the plaintiffs have not es-
tablished that the underutilization criteria was the cause of the racial
imbalance.73 The court further reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to
prove a racial imbalance between the list of schools that could possi-
bly be closed, and the list of schools ultimately chosen to be closed.74
Also, the evidence alleging that Black students make up 40.5% of the
students in CPS was skewed because this percentage included high
schools and charter schools, while the school closings covered only
elementary and middle schools.75 Therefore, the court held that the
underutilization criteria was a generalized policy and not specifically
sufficient to prove a disparate impact.76
ii. Actionable Harm
The plaintiffs must also prove that there was an actionable harm to
succeed on an ICRA claim.77 The court, however, ruled that the plain-
tiff’s evidence was insufficient to establish that Black students suffered
an actionable harm from the school closures because the common oc-
currence of simply closing a school did not constitute an actionable
harm.78 The court generalized that while forcing children to change
schools may be traumatic, it is not a recognized injury the law can
remedy.79 There was also overwhelming evidence that students may
actually gain academic benefits from the school closures, including the
plaintiff’s expert testimony and two studies showing that school clo-
71. Id.
72. Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *20.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *21.
78. Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *21.
79. Id. To make its point, the court cites the Eastern District of New York in Incantalupo v.
Lawrence Union Free School District No. 15, in which that court stated: “Unquestionably, any
plan that forces children to change schools may be dramatic for children and parents alike. . . .
But this Court cannot enjoin conduct unless that harm is a ‘cognizable injury’ that the law pro-
tects against . . . .” 652 F. Supp. 2d 314, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at
*21.
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sures did not enjoin students with any long-term effects regarding aca-
demic achievement.80
iii. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason
If an actionable harm has been established, then the burden shifts
to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason by
a preponderance of evidence—here, the defendants succeeded in ar-
ticulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.81 The defendants’
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the school closures was the
underutilization of school buildings that was a result of declining en-
rollment and a $1 billion structural deficit.82 By closing these un-
derutilized buildings, the defendants rationalized that they could
divert the resources being used to maintain those buildings to benefit
students directly instead.83 The Board estimated “that the school clos-
ings will save between $40 and $43 million annually in operating costs
and $438 million over the next ten years.”84 The plaintiffs challenged
these amounts stating that the defendants erred in calculating certain
funds and that the numbers were unrealistic.85 However, the court
found that regardless of whether the amount of money saved was min-
imal or not, reallocating resources into efficiently utilized buildings to
benefit students is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.86
iv. Equally Valid, Less Discriminatory Alternative
The plaintiffs also failed to establish a less discriminatory alterna-
tive channel the defendants could have utilized to accomplish their
legitimate, nondiscriminatory goal.87 Courts typically decide if the
proffered alternative is valid by evaluating the burdens that are pro-
duced from its execution.88 The court viewed the plaintiffs’ argument
that maintaining the status quo is a better alternative as unpersuasive
because it does not remedy the harm of wasting resources on an un-
derutilized building.89 This is an issue because several witnesses testi-
fied that these funds could be reallocated to support other educational
80. Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *21–22.
81. Id. at *19, *24.
82. Id. at *24.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *25.
86. Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *25. The legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is only a burden
of production, not a burden or persuasion. Id. at *19.
87. Id. at *25.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *26.
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goals such as financing enough teachers to support a teacher for each
grade.90 Without this support, a single teacher would be forced to
teach two different curriculums, “dividing the teacher’s attention and
depriving students of grade-level instruction and full teacher
interaction.”91
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the Board
should have simply moved the surplus students into the underutilized
buildings.92 This alternative was not feasible because the underutilized
schools and overcrowded schools were an unreasonable distance from
each other.93 CPS operates under the requirement “that students
should not be required to travel more than a mile to their neighbor-
hood school.”94 The plaintiffs failed to prove that there was any pre-
text present.95
The plaintiffs failed to prove the four elements for disparate impact
under ICRA, and therefore, the court found that the plaintiffs were
not likely to succeed on their disparate impact claim and did not fulfill
the requirements for a preliminary injunction. The analysis of the dis-
parate impact claim in Swan is the same standard applied in the analy-
sis used in the Board of Education v. Rauner case.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: BOARD OF EDUCATION V. RAUNER
In Board of Education v. Rauner, the court considered whether the
State’s funding for public education, which included the pension fund
requirements, had a disparate impact on CPS and its students.96 This
Note focuses on the Pension Fund Code in Rauner. Sections 16 and 17
of the Illinois Pension Code provide that the State must fund teacher
retirement systems (TRS) if the district’s population is under
500,000.97 Therefore, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago
must fund the teacher pensions for all teachers in Chicago pursuant to
Section 17 of the Illinois Pension Fund.98 CPS is the only school dis-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *26.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at *27.
96. No. 2017 CH 2157, 2017 WL 2407356, at *2 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017).
97. Id. at *2; 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-158 (2013 & Supp. 2018); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-102
(2013 & Supp. 2018) (“This Article shall not apply to cities and school districts of more than
500,000 population as shown by the last preceding Federal census.”).
98. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *2 (“The ultimate responsibility for funding a public school
teacher pension fund governed by article 17 is the board of education for the city in which the
fund is maintained and operated.”); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17-129 (2013).
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trict in Illinois that must fund its own teacher pensions, ultimately de-
pleting the district’s budget, leaving CPS in a huge financial deficit.99
The plaintiffs alleged that, “CPS anticipate[d] that it will spend
$1,891 per student of [the Chicago Teachers Pension Fund], while the
State will have contributed $32 per student” in contrast to other dis-
tricts which “are spending $86 per student on TRS pensions, while the
State is spending $2,437 per student.”100 CPS is made up of predomi-
nantly Black and Hispanic students, while only 4% of the State’s
white children in public schools attend a CPS school.101 CPS was in
such dire need that the Illinois House of Representatives recom-
mended a bill to include $215 million to help with the teacher pension
payments.102 However, Governor Rauner vetoed the bill on Decem-
ber 1, 2016.103
The plaintiffs brought this action asserting that the public school
funding, specifically the unequal allocation of funding for the teacher
pension funds, had a disparate impact on students in CPS.104 This dis-
crepancy “reduce[d] the amount of resources available to CPS for ed-
ucational purposes,” which lowered the educational value of CPS
students.105 The plaintiffs requested a declaration that the State’s
funding scheme, as a result incidental to the allocation of pension
funds, violated ICRA.106 They also sought an injunction against the
defendants to halt the distribution of state funds.107 The court granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss, mainly because of the defendants’
assertion that the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to identify the alleged ‘discrimina-
tory practices’ and fail[ed] to link their allegation to any program or
activity.”108 The court also ruled that “the plaintiffs [did] not connect
the allegation to criteria or methods of administration.”109 Therefore,
the court held that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the
99. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *3.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *2 (“Approximately 90% of CPS students are children of color, while 10% of
students are white. . . . Among public school students in Illinois, an African American child is
approximately 11 times more likely than a white child to attend CPS, and a Hispanic child is 9
times more likely than a white child to attend CPS.”).
102. Id. at *3 (“On June 30, 2016, the Illinois House amended Senate Bill 2822 to include
additional State contribution of $215 million dollars to assist CPS to meet its required Fiscal
Year 2017 teacher pension payment of $721 million.”).
103. Id.
104. Id. at *14.
105. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *14.
106. Id. at *4.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *36.
109. Id.
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merits of their claims, thus not satisfying the requirements for a pre-
liminary injunction.110
The plaintiffs brought a disparate impact claim challenging the allo-
cation of the teacher pension funding policy as having a “dispropor-
tionately adverse effect on minorities” and claiming there was no
legitimate reason for the State to implement it.111 “Section 5(a)(2) of
ICRA prohibits any unit of government in the State of Illinois from
utilizing any criteria or method of administration in any program or
activity that has the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination
on the basis of their race, color, national, origin, or gender.”112 ICRA
was enacted to provide individuals “claims based on a disparate im-
pact theory of liability.”113 ICRA is analogous to the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and thus is interpreted in a similar manner.114 Federal courts
deciding cases litigated under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 use a three-
step analysis for discrimination claims under the disparate impact the-
ory.115 First, the plaintiff must establish that “a facially neutral policy
ha[d] a significant adverse impact on members of a protected minority
group.”116 Next, the defendant must show that the practice “had [a]
‘manifest relationship’ to a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy objec-
tive and was necessary to the attainment of that objective.”117 Finally,
if the defendant satisfies that criteria, the plaintiff must show that
there is an alternative means to achieve that same objective without
discriminatory effects.118 However, the court did not get that far in its
analysis.
The plaintiffs argued that the public funding and teacher pension
funding had a “‘disproportionately adverse effect on minorities’ and
are otherwise unjustified to a legitimate rationale.”119 The defendants
rebutted that the plaintiffs did not identify a specific criteria or
method, and the plaintiffs solely made a conclusory allegation of dis-
crimination and instead relied on a bottom-line theory of disparate
impact.120 The plaintiffs responded by characterizing the “practice of
110. Id. at *36.
111. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *32 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclu-
sive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015)).
112. Id.; see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/5(a)(2) (2010).
113. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *31.
114. Id. at *32.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 833 (8th Cir. 2010)).
117. Id. (quoting Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 833).
118. Id.
119. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *32 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclu-
sive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015)).
120. Id. at *33.
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appropriating 99.7% of the State’s teacher pension contributions to
TRS, while directing 0.3% of those contributions” to the Chicago
Teachers’ Pension Fund as the “method” that created a discriminatory
impact.121 The plaintiffs bolstered their argument that the State’s
funding scheme violated Section 5(a)(2) of ICRA when determining
that CPS receives approximately 15% of the funding, while serving
20% of the State’s students.122 The court, however, differentiated be-
tween the state financial aid that is pursuant to the School Code and
contributions to the public school teacher pensions that are pursuant
to the Pension Code.123 They determined that there was no “specific,
overarching criteria or methods of administering the various sources
of funding public schools and public school teacher pensions that have
a disparate impact prohibited by ICRA;” it was simply the Pension
Code and School Code that imposed discriminatory obligations on
CPS.124 Accordingly, the plaintiffs did not allege in the complaint that
“the [d]efendants administer[ed] the School Code’s general state aid
through criteria or methods that result[ed] in a disparate impact,” but
instead only that the School Code itself created a disparate impact.125
Here, the case was dismissed on the grounds that under ICRA, the
general state funding and pension funding does not constitute a spe-
cific method or administration that caused disparate effects.126 The
court admitted that, “To say that the State’s current scheme of funding
public education is broken is to state the obvious. Plaintiffs’ Com-
plaint, however, as constituted is not the vehicle to redress this
inequity.”127
IV. ANALYSIS
A broken system of funding public education, however, has had ab-
horrent effects on minority children in Chicago. In analyzing how to
create an equal public school funding system, this Part evaluates the
ideologies and obstacles that have allowed the past discriminatory
practices to manifest. Therefore, this Part emphasizes the issues with
an adequate education being the standard in public school funding
litigation. Second, this Part analyzes the importance of judicial activ-
ism in public school funding litigation. Third, this Part reassesses the
121. Id. at *29.
122. Id. at *33.
123. Id. at *33–34.
124. Id. at *33.
125. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *34.
126. Id.
127. Id. at *38.
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disparate impact standard in Rauner in accordance with Swan. Finally,
after these major hurdles are discussed, this Part advocates for the
alteration of the disparate impact standard in public school funding
litigation because it effects a vulnerable societal group. The courts
should emphasize the starkness of the impact created as a result of the
funding scheme when evaluating all public school funding litigation by
creating a balancing test instead. This change in the analysis will help
remedy the discrimination that has survived under the current proce-
dure for public school funding litigation.
A. The Inefficiencies of Adequacy
There has been much debate, but little change, about whether ade-
quacy of education is a proper benchmark in regard to public school
funding.128 Similar to the Illinois school funding system supported by
Rauner, as discussed above, “adequacy” is developed in every state
constitution because states only require an education to be free, lib-
eral, efficient, or thorough.129 “Adequacy” means that “all children
have access to a certain threshold of educational opportunities.”130
“Equality,” by contrast, is where “all children have equal educational
opportunities.”131 The idea of adequacy is severely criticized because
it is inherently ambiguous.132 It also maintains a cavalier disregard to
the inequalities that occur once the threshold is attained—inequalities
that “exacerbate the positional advantage” of students in more afflu-
ent school districts.133 Adequacy as a legal standard for education en-
ables privileged groups to segregate themselves from those less
privileged.134
The standard of adequacy originates from the positive thesis of the
sufficiency doctrine, which “stresses the importance of people living
above a certain threshold.”135 Many do not find it objectionable for
parents and school districts to decide to spend more money on their
128. See generally Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 477 (2014).
129. Id. at 517 (“The language of these one-dormant education clauses vary. Some require
simply a ‘free’ or ‘liberal’ school system; others demand an education that is ‘general,’ ‘uniform,’
‘thorough,’ ‘efficient,’ or some permutation thereof . . . .” (quoting Regina R. Umpstead, Deter-
mining Adequacy: How Courts Are Redefining State Responsibility for Educational Finance,
Goals, and Accountability, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 281, 289 n.20 (2007))).
130. Id. at 478.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 482.
133. Id. (quoting Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Slaying the Inequality Villain in School
Finance: Is the Right to Education the Silver Bullet?, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 368 (2011)).
134. Weishart, supra note 128, at 515–16. R
135. Paula Casal, Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough, 117 ETHICS 296, 297–98 (2007).
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own children’s education, provided that the threshold is met for all
children.136 However, this is highly unfair because it creates an
achievement gap, especially in regard to higher education.137 The se-
lection process in our country is founded on the idea that an applicant
will be competitive only if the educational attainment is equivalent to
or greater than that of her peers.138 But getting “enough” is not fair if
others are getting more opportunities and are able to protect and en-
hance their advantage among the competition and in society as time
continues.139 In Rodriguez, Justice Marshall dissented stating that, “it
is an inescapable fact that if one district has more funds available per
pupil than another district, the former will have greater choice in edu-
cational planning.”140 A child forced to attend an underfunded school
will endure bad facilities, less experienced teachers, and a narrower
course offering.141 Justice Marshall proclaimed that “this Court has
never suggested that because some ‘adequate’ level of benefits is pro-
vided to all, discrimination in the provision of services is therefore
constitutionally excusable.”142 Some argue that this sort of injustice
can be combated by affirmative action programs.143 Colleges should
discount those who had an advantage in their previous education,
thereby evening the stakes between the affluent and non-affluent
school districts.144 American history, however, has not proven the will-
ingness of the privileged to put their education needs second to help
the disadvantaged group.145 Therefore, the public school funding cases
136. See Elizabeth Anderson, Rethinking Equality of Opportunity: Comment on Adam Swift’s
How Not to Be a Hypocrite, 2 THEORY & RES. EDUC. 99, 103–07 (2004). Anderson ultimately
rejects Adam Swift’s notion that two people with “equal underlying potential should have their
talents and motivations developed to the same degree” regardless of parental resources. Id. at
104. She supports the idea that students do not need equal opportunities; rather, they just need
enough opportunities. Id. at 105–06.
137. Weishart, supra note 128, at 522 n.242 (“[T]here is some evidence to support the posi- R
tional nature of education. For instance, students from private schools or wealthy school districts
hold an advantage over students from low-income families and poorly financed public schools in
the competition for admission to selective universities and graduate schools.” (internal citation
omitted)).
138. Id. at 522.
139. Id.
140. San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 83–84 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
141. Id. at 84.
142. Id. at 89.
143. Weishart, supra note 128, at 523. R
144. Id.
145. A theory by Derrick Bell indicates that in America, civil rights are not typically altered
unless it is in the interest of the privileged. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 513, 523–26 (1980). The interest con-
vergence theory posits that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommo-
dated only when it converges with the interest of white[ elites].” Id. at 523. The argument is that
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that have relied on this sort of adequate education standard must be
reevaluated, as should Rauner. The disparate impact theory of liability
only requires the showing of a “disproportionate adverse effect on mi-
norities” that is “otherwise unjustified to a legitimate rationale” to
prove discrimination.146 However, the disparate impact analysis places
the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff instead of the defendant, en-
abling this crippling ideology of an adequate education to prosper.147
In Rauner, the court required a specific method of administration that
was discriminatory instead of the broad underpinnings of the public
funding allocation that indicated a low-quality education, ultimately
causing a poverty-stricken cycle.148 This is because the court relied
upon the idea of an adequate education for all, not an equal education
for all.
B. The Importance of Judicial Activism Public School Funding
Litigation
When the legislature missteps, it is the court’s responsibility to step
in. An intense debate about judicial activism in education began with
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education because it substantially
affected public policy.149 Federal courts have promoted institutional
reform in schools regarding race, gender, and special education,150 yet
continue to allow states to fail in finding a solution for public school
funding. In reality, judicial activism in state reform is necessary to en-
force rights.151 Also, education is critical to the exercise of fundamen-
tal rights because it gives everyone “the ability to effectively petition
the government for redress of grievances” that have been imposed on
it was only due to white interests coincidentally colliding with racial equality measures that
broke the Court’s long-held position on these issues in Brown v. Board of Education. Id. at 524.
White elites had three interests in ending segregation: (1) it would provide credibility to America
against communist factions to win the hearts of third world people, who were mostly people of
color at the time when the United States was fighting in the Cold War to stop the spread of
communism; (2) the decision would offer reassurance to Black soldiers that when they returned
from World War II, they would not continue to face discrimination; and (3) the realization of
some whites that transitioning from a rural, segregated South to a more profitable, desegregated
South that could tap into the potential of industrialization. Id. at 523–25.
146. Bd. of Educ. v. Rauner, No. 2017 CH 2157, 2017 WL 2407356, at *32 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017)
(quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2513 (2015)).
147. Id. (explaining that the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case
under a disparate impact theory of liability).
148. Id. at *33.
149. Michael A. Rebell, “Judicial Activism” and Public Policy, 50 JUDGES’ J. 9, 9 (2011).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 10.
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their rights.152 Some argue that all policy decisions should be deter-
mined by the legislature because of the political process it is founded
upon.153 However, courts have always delved into complicated issues,
and the election of judges and their appointments do not render them
without any political experience in attaining what is needed for their
constituents.154 In fact, studies show that judicial involvement in reme-
dying education issues is “both less intrusive and more competent
than generally assumed.”155 It seems that the legislature wants the
courts to take on more policy-making responsibility. This is evidenced
by the legislature’s continued creation of broad statutes that can be
widely interpreted, especially in regard to education and funding, as
seen in Rauner.156 The Illinois Civil Rights Act reads that:
No unit of the State, county, or local government in Illinois shall . . .
exclude a person from participation in, deny a person the benefits
of, or subject a person to discrimination under any program or ac-
tivity on the grounds of that person’s race, color, national origin, or
gender . . . .157
The Act, however, does not define “program” or “activity.”158 The
allocation of education funding by way of property taxes should con-
stitute an “activity.” Also, the policy that assigns CPS the responsibil-
ity of funding teacher pensions should be considered a “program” that
falls under the statute. However, the Rauner court ruled that the
above did not qualify as “specific criteria or method of administering,”
but the court refrained from defining these statutory terms.159 This
ambiguous language is precisely why a judicial remedy is necessary.
Instead, the only reason given in the opinion was built around rebut-
ting any argument that the specific methods or programs were used to
discriminate.160 Therefore, judicial activism in public school funding
litigation is essential to promulgating equality in education.
C. Disparate Impact and Perpetuating an “Adequate” Education
The Swan case is analogous to the Rauner case in its application of
the disparate impact scrutiny. In fact, the Rauner case cited the Swan
152. Watson, supra note 3, at 402–03. R
153. Rebell, supra note 149, at 10. R
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., id. at 11 (noting “the legislative trend toward creating new statutory rights that
expand the enforcement responsibility of the courts”).
157. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/5 (2010).
158. Id.
159. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *33–36.
160. Id. at *36.
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case in numerous occasions but did not apply it correctly.161 Similar to
Swan, the Rauner plaintiffs were seeking a preliminary injunction.162
The Rauner and Swan courts both failed to find a likelihood that the
districts’ funding created a disparate impact under ICRA.163
1. Discrimination Policy
Under Title VI, to prove an adverse disparate impact, the plaintiff
must identify a discriminatory policy or practice that resulted in a dis-
parate harm to those in a protected class.164 In Swan, the court con-
cluded that school closures disproportionately affecting Black
majority schools did not show that the Board’s underutilization calcu-
lation caused any disparate impact.165 It stressed that this statistic was
insufficient to prove a disparate impact because the underutilization
method was a generalized policy and numerous other criteria were
used to decide which schools to close.166 This is distinguishable from
Rauner because the plaintiffs there alleged that the allocation in the
Pension Code was more than just a general policy.167 Under the Pen-
sion Code, the State provides funding for teacher retirement systems
only if the district’s population is under 500,000.168 Therefore, CPS has
to fund its own teacher pensions and is the only district in Illinois that
must divert a portion of its budget to teacher pensions.169 This is a
specific criterion used because there is no other criteria except popu-
lation as stated in the statute. The Pension Code and School Code
only allow the State to fund teacher pension funds for cities with a
population over 500,000, but it is not required. Therefore, the State’s
specific method that is causing a disparate impact is its choice to ap-
propriate 99.7% of pension funds to every other district, while only
supplying 0.3% to CPS’s pension funds.170
161. Id. at *29.
162. Id. at *6. There are three requirements to a preliminary injunction: (1) the plaintiffs must
show that it will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, (2) that the traditional legal
remedies would be inadequate, and (3) that its claim has some likelihood of succeeding on the
merits. Id.
163. See generally id.; Swan v. Bd. of Educ., No. 13 C 3623, 2013 WL 4401439 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
15, 2013).
164. Title VI Legal Manual, supra note 47, at 11. R
165. See Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *19 (“Plaintiffs offer a single statistic: African-American
students make up 87% of the students in the closing schools, but only 40.5% of the students in
CPS as a whole.”).
166. See id. at *20.
167. See Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *29.
168. See id. at *2.
169. See id. at *3.
170. See id. at *29.
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The Swan court also reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to show a
statistical imbalance between the racial composition of the schools eli-
gible for closure and those actually chosen for closure.171 In contrast,
the Rauner plaintiffs clearly alleged a statistical imbalance between
the number of districts that receive funding for their teacher pensions
and those that do not.172 The school districts with a majority non-mi-
nority population have pensions funded by the State. However, CPS,
which has a large Black population and only 10% white students, does
not receive funding from the State and mostly uses its own budget for
teacher pensions.173 The State contributes $2,437 per student to
teacher pension funds in Illinois school districts outside of CPS, in
comparison to only contributing $32 per student to the CPS teacher
pension fund, thus this criteria has created a disparate impact.174 In
Rauner, the court stopped its analysis of disparate impact here, finding
that there was no specific method the defendants employed, and
therefore, the disparate impact claim was not feasible.175 However, as
shown, there was a specific method, therefore this Note will continue
to evaluate the pension fund allocation policy under the disparate im-
pact analysis, as the court should have.
2. Actionable Harm
The plaintiffs must next prove that there was an actionable harm to
succeed on an ICRA claim.176 An actionable harm is sufficiently es-
tablished when the court can determine that the “nature, size, or like-
lihood of the impact” is sufficient to be considered adverse or
harmful.177 In Swan, the court held that school closures themselves
were not an actionable harm.178 The Board closed the schools to bet-
ter utilize the resources to help create better schools and better educa-
tional systems, and therefore, the court reasoned that the school
closures were an academic benefit and not detrimental or harmful to
the students.179 The court defined an actionable harm as “a ‘cogniza-
171. See Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *20.
172. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *29 (“[In] Swan, . . . Plaintiffs w[ere] concerned with a
‘bottom line’ statistical imbalance which was caused by numerous factors. By contrast, assert
Plaintiffs, in this case only one factor has caused the bottom line disparity, to wit: the States’
decision to continue funding TRS in full, while declining to provide any material funding to
CTPF.”).
173. See id. at *2–3.
174. See id. at *3.
175. See id. at *33.
176. See id. at *15; see also Title VI Legal Manual, supra note 47, at 14. R
177. Title VI Legal Manual, supra note 47, at 14. R
178. Swan v. Bd. of Educ., No. 13 C 3623, 2013 WL 4401439, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013).
179. Id.
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ble injury’ that the law protects against.”180 In Rauner, however, the
adverse effects include: school closings, a lack of resources, and un-
derfunding. However, the unfair allocation of pension funds that cre-
ated these adverse effects is not justified by the so-called benefits
established in Swan. Instead, these were detrimental harms that were
perpetuated by CPS’s debt, which was created by its responsibility to
fund teacher pensions. The money that was diverted to pay the
teacher pension fund could have been used for textbooks, more exper-
ienced teachers, safety measures, and other systems. Therefore, there
was an actionable harm established in Rauner.
3. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason
In a disparate impact claim under ICRA, the burden of production
is on the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for their actions. In Swan, the court held that the Board had a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its implementation of the underu-
tilization criteria, as it was used to reallocate the resources being spent
on the now-closed buildings.181 In Rauner, however, there is no legiti-
mate reason stated for “appropriating 99.7% of the State’s teacher
pension contributions to TRS, while directing 0.3% of those contribu-
tions to CTPF.”182 In fact, any reason proffered could be seen as pre-
text because the city with the highest percentage of Blacks in Illinois is
also the only city in Illinois that has a population over 500,000. Chil-
dren attending Illinois public schools other than CPS are 58% white,
while 12% are Black and 21% are Hispanic.183 On the other hand,
“Approximately 42% of the State’s African American public school
children, 34% of the State’s Hispanic public school children, and 4%
of the State’s white public school children attend CPS.”184 Black chil-
dren are 11 times more likely than white children to attend CPS, and
Hispanic children are 9 times more likely than white children to at-
tend CPS.185 CPS also contains more minorities than any other district
in Illinois.186 Therefore, the defendants do not have a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the pension fund allocation criteria of a
180. Id. (quoting Incantalupo v. Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 652 F. Supp. 2d 314,
329 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).
181. Id. at *24–25.
182. Bd. of Educ. v. Rauner, No. 2017 CH 2157, 2017 WL 2407356, at *29 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017).
183. Id. at *2.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (“Approximately 90% of CPS students are children of color, while 10% of students
are white.”).
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500,000 population, and even if they brought such a reason forward it
is possible and likely that the court would construe it as pretextual.
4. Equally Valid, Less Discriminatory Alternative
If the defendants did justify their decision, then the burden shifts
back to the plaintiffs to establish that there was an equally valid, less
discriminatory alternative the defendants could have employed.187 In
Swan, the court rejected the idea that doing nothing in lieu of closing
schools would be an alternative because doing nothing would ignore
the harms done to the students.188 However, this is distinguishable
from what is happening in Rauner. As the State continues to appropri-
ate pension funds in such an indiscreet manner between the predomi-
nantly white school districts and CPS, CPS continues to fall into
deeper and deeper financial debt.189 The Illinois House of Represent-
atives believed this debt could only be cured by a $215 million bailout
bill.190 Therefore, doing nothing, as the Rauner defendants and the
State of Illinois chose, was reckless and further perpetuates the idea
that giving minority children an adequate education instead of an
equal education to their white counterparts is justified.
Throughout many public school funding litigation cases, there were
several alternatives that could create a more equitable allocation sys-
tem for certain districts. Disproportionately allocating pension funds
is not one of them. The Edgar court discussed a proposed constitu-
tional provision “designed to reduce funding disparities among dis-
tricts by limiting the amount of funds that could be raised from local
property taxes.”191 This idea was previously discussed in McInnis v.
Shapiro, where the court stated that only the Illinois legislature can
make this funding adjustment because only the legislature can conduct
studies, hold discussions, and continuously revise the statute.192 The
Edgar court also advised that “[s]olutions to problems of educational
quality should emerge from a spirited dialogue between the people of
the State and their elected representatives.”193 Plaintiffs in both cases
urged that the discussion of education funding should always center
187. Id. at *32.
188. Swan v. Bd. of Educ., No. 13 C 3623, 2013 WL 4401439, at *26 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013).
189. See Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *3 (describing the financial situation of CPS during
Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017 and stating that “CPS began Fiscal Year 2017 with a $300 million
operating deficit”).
190. See id. (discussing proposed legislation, which would have increased the State’s contribu-
tion to CPS to $215 million, but was ultimately vetoed by Governor Rauner).
191. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1184 (Ill. 1996).
192. 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
193. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1191.
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around the students’ needs because this will guarantee equal educa-
tion opportunities to all students without depriving the quality of edu-
cation in more affluent neighborhoods.194 These alternatives focus on
the broader goal of education, and the next Part will discuss more
specific plans for public school funding.
Another option to create a more equitable public school funding
system would be to raise the individual income tax as a collective of
the State to make up for the discrepancy between the different dis-
tricts.195 Therefore, the gap between poorer school districts would be
closer due to the surplus in funds available.196 The State could also
expand the sales tax base to include certain services and neighboring
states, and the proceeds could be allocated to public school funding.197
In Illinois, there are only seventeen services that are taxed, and there
is room for more to be implemented so that more money can be allo-
cated to fix the discrepancy between affluent and non-affluent school
districts.198 Finally, another alternative is to implement a financial
transaction tax.199 A financial transaction tax is levied on stocks,
bonds, mutual funds, and other securities.200 This was used during the
Great Depression and doubled revenue.201 It is currently used in more
than thirty countries worldwide.202 Most of these countries use the
money to fund essential government programs and education.203 The
regressive public school funding in Illinois is going to get worse unless
an alternative is used. If not, the disparities between the affluent
school districts and non-affluent school districts, the poor and wealthy,
and minority students’ and white students’ educational opportunities
will grow.
Currently, the burden of persuasion always stays with the plaintiff;
therefore, the defendant is not required to prove that these alterna-
tives will not work, but instead the plaintiff is required to show by a
preponderance of evidence that the alternatives will work.204 How-
194. See id. at 1183; McInnis, 293 F. Supp. at 336.
195. JILL MANZO, FRANK MANZO IV, & ROBERT BRUNO, ALTERNATIVE STATE AND LOCAL
OPTIONS TO FUND PUBLIC K-12 EDUCATION IN ILLINOIS 1, 4 (2017), https://ler.illinois.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/ILEPI-PMCR-Alternative-State-and-Local-Options-to-Fund-Educa
tion-in-Illinois-FINAL.pdf.
196. Id. at 1, 4, 7.
197. Id. at 6.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 8.
200. Id.
201. MANZO, MANZO, & BRUNO, supra note 195, at 8. R
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Title VI Legal Manual, supra note 47, at 40. R
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ever, due to the evidentiary burden largely weighing on the plaintiff’s
shoulders, this Note continues by discussing the importance of the
courts placing more weight on the starkness of the discriminatory
impact.
D. A New Application of Disparate Impact Evaluating Starkness
The three-step analysis for discrimination claims under the dispa-
rate impact theory is typically used to evaluate discrimination in the
context of employment.205 However, the disparate impact in Rauner is
so extreme that the three-step analysis needs to be altered to put more
emphasis on the starkness of the impact between the protected class
and the majority. The burden-shifting analysis also should be replaced
by balancing the defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
implementing the discriminatory policy against the resulting disparate
impact. This would alleviate some of the burden placed on the plain-
tiff in public school funding litigation and force the defendant to not
only articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the policy but to
demonstrate that the reason outweighs the impact placed on these
vulnerable children. The starkness of the impact should hold extreme
leverage in this analysis.
Achievement gaps are “not a reflection on students’ ability to learn,
but rather on the inadequacies of our education system” that has per-
petuated “the legacy of racism” in the United States.206 The disparate
impact theory “challenges practices that have a ‘disproportionately
adverse effect on minorities’ and are otherwise unjustified to a legiti-
mate rationale” without intent needed.207 The disparate impact theory
relies on the idea that in some cases, a statute’s disproportionate im-
pact will be “‘stark’ enough to prove the act’s purpose.”208 Many be-
lieve that you can determine the real intent of the legislature by
examining the discriminatory impact of the statute.209 Take Griggs v.
Duke Power, where the employer required that those who were seek-
ing jobs or promotions must have a high school diploma and pass an
intelligence test.210 These requirements were applied equally to all
205. See, e.g., id. at 13–14.
206. Sarah Albertson, Comment, The Achievement Gap and Disparate Impact Discrimination
in Washington Schools, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1919, 1921 (2013).
207. Bd. of Educ. v. Rauner, No. 2017 CH 2157, 2017 WL 2407356, at *32 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017)
(quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2513 (2015)).
208. Scott E. Rosenow, Heightened Equal-Protection Scrutiny Applies to Disparate-Impact
Doctrine, 20 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 163, 181 (2015).
209. Id. at 181–84.
210. 401 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1971).
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races but had a disproportionate impact on Blacks due to the inferior
education they received in segregated schools.211 The Supreme Court
held that the requirements violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be-
cause it prohibited “not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”212 These tests
would have allowed for those with advanced education to be hired,
which many could argue would better the business. However, the
Court knew that this test would discriminatorily impact minority ap-
plicants that had legally been given a second-class education up until
the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 was passed. The Court should have bal-
anced the stark impact versus the justification given by the defend-
ants. In Griggs, the Court ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor without
balancing the two, and instead it used the burden-shifting analysis.213
But in public school funding litigation the courts rarely side with the
plaintiffs. Therefore, a change is needed in how we analyze public
school funding litigation.
The Rauner court should have evaluated the public-school funding
in Chicago by placing the weight of the discrepancy of the impact at
the forefront and balancing it against the defendants’ justification. The
disparate impact theory was best suited for the facts of Rauner be-
cause it highlights the racial disparities that have detrimental effects
on minorities regardless of the legislature’s intentions. The plaintiffs
would have needed to prove a starkly uneven impact along a particu-
lar line with negation of any other purpose.214 The following cases
demonstrate examples of how the disparate impact theory can and
should be utilized when determining discrimination by looking at the
starkness of the impact.
In Guinn v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down a law
that imposed a literacy requirement on voters by exempting voters
whose ancestors were not able to vote before the ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment.215 The Fifteenth Amendment prohibited the
denial for the right to vote based on race, resulting in zero Black vot-
ers being eligible.216 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the defendant granted
business permits to all but one of the non-Chinese applicants, while
denying permits to over 200 Chinese applicants despite their compli-
ance with all requirements.217 Because officials gave no reason for
211. Id. at 430.
212. Id. at 431.
213. Id. at 432–36.
214. Albertson, supra note 206, at 1924–25. R
215. 238 U.S. 347, 357, 363–64 (1915).
216. Id. at 358.
217. 118 U.S. 356, 359 (1886).
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these denials, the Court held that the defendant discriminatorily ap-
plied a facially neutral law, thus violating the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.218 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, a state legislature reshaped the
voting boundaries from a square to a twenty-eight sided figure that
removed 395 out of 400 Black votes, but removed no white votes from
the city election.219 These cases are analogous to Rauner because of
the stark line drawn between the treatment of two different groups.
Here, the legislature drew a line dividing populations of over 500,000
from those under 500,000, but the State decided to appropriate only
0.3% of the pension funds to CPS teachers.220 “Coincidentally,” this
line also divided the rich from the poor, and white students from mi-
nority students.221
These stark differences are comparable to the denial of Chinese ap-
plicants in Yick Wo and the denial of voting rights to Black voters in
Gomillion and Guinn. Similarly, the Illinois statute’s discriminatory
impact is justified neither by using population as a criterion nor by
assigning CPS the responsibility to fund teacher funds instead of the
State.
Across the United States, the public school system “is failing mil-
lions of children—especially children of color, poor children, English
learners, and those with disabilities”222 and Chicago is exemplary. A
study conducted by the Fordham Institute found that 39% of teachers
in Chicago send their own children to private schools outside of the
district where they teach.223 Of CPS students, 90% are students of
color, while only 10% are white.224 More specifically, 38% of the stu-
dents are Black, 47% are Hispanic, and 6% are other minorities.225
CPS received just 15% of the state’s total education funding despite
having nearly 20% of public school students.226 Illinois has one of the
largest gaps in the country between the funding of wealthy school dis-
218. Id. at 373–74.
219. 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
220. Bd. of Educ. v. Rauner, No. 2017 CH 2157, 2017 WL 2407356, at *2, *29 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
2017).
221. See infra Part V for a discussion of how poor education reaffirms the cycle of poverty.
222. Dianne Piche´ et al., Remedying Disparate Impact in Education, 38 HUM. RTS. 15, 16
(2011).
223. Scott Reeder, A Study Found that 39 Percent of CPS Teachers Send Their Children to
Private Schools, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 10, 2017, 4:37 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/
daily-southtown/opinion/ct-reeder-column-st-0312-20170310-story.html.
224. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *2; Adeshina Emmanuel, Here’s Some Advice for CPS’
Future Chief of Equity Officer in Year One, CHALKBEAT (July 24, 2018), https://chalkbeat.org/
posts/chicago/2018/07/24/heres-some-advice-for-cps-future-chief-equity-officer-in-year-one/.
225. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *2; CPS Stats and Facts: Students, CHI. PUB. SCHS., https://
cps.edu/About_CPS/At-a-glance/Pages/Stats_and_facts.aspx (last updated Oct. 2018).
226. Rauner, 2017 WL 2407356, at *33.
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tricts versus poor school districts.227 Additionally, CPS students score
below the state average in all subjects tested by the ACT.228 These
astronomically different statistics hit minority students the hardest be-
cause they make up the dominant demographic in these schools. In
the future, if public school funding cases look to the starkness of the
discriminatory impact placed on vulnerable groups, such as minority
children, and balance it against the defendant’s proffered reason, it
will likely find the impact outweighs the reason for the discriminatory
policy.
A key counter argument to using the disparate impact theory when
evaluating achievement gaps in education is that several factors other
than race lead to an achievement gap.229 Studies show that achieve-
ment can differ depending on age, disability, gender, background, or
language.230 However, we have seen these disparities cross racial lines
the most often. For instance, in CPS, 74% of white and Asian students
in the district are enrolled in International Baccalaureate or Ad-
vanced Placement (IB/AP) classes, whereas only 43% of students of
color are enrolled.231 Also, in the rest of Illinois 50% of students are
college-ready in comparison to the 29% that are college-ready in
CPS.232 Regardless of whether race is the only factor, racial imbalance
is frequently intertwined with a low quality of education given in cer-
tain school districts such as CPS.
V. IMPACT OF REEVALUATING PUBLIC FUNDING ALLOCATION:
CYCLE OF EDUCATION AND POVERTY
The need for courts to reevaluate public school funding cases like
Rauner is critical because the impact of an adequate education in the
United States aggravates the cycle of poverty. By applying the dispa-
227. Lorraine Bailey, Illinois Governor Signs ‘Historic’ Education Funding Bill, COURTHOUSE
NEWS (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.courthousenews.com/illinois-governor-signs-historic-educa
tion-funding-bill/.
228. See generally CITY OF CHI. SD 299, 15-016-2990-25-0000, 2017 ILLINOIS DISTRICT RE-
PORT CARD (2017), http://webprod.isbe.net/ereportcard/publicsite/getReport.aspx?year=
2017&code=150162990_e.pdf (providing statistics for students’ achievements calculated for vari-
ous categories).
229. Brandis Friedman, How CPS Is Hoping to Bridge Another Achievement Gap, WTTW
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2017, 7:43 PM), https://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2017/10/26/how-cps-hoping-
bridge-another-achievement-gap.
230. Id.
231. Press Release, Chi. Pub. Schs., CPS Joins Initiative to Close the Participation Gap in
College-Level Courses (Oct. 26, 2017), https://cps.edu/News/Press_releases/Pages/
PR1_10_26_17.aspx (indicating that these statistics are calculated for the 11th and 12th grade
populations in CPS).
232. CITY OF CHI. SD 299, supra note 228, at 4. R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-3\DPL306.txt unknown Seq: 29 29-MAY-19 17:00
2019] “CAUSE I AIN’T GOT NO PENCIL” 729
rate impact theory of liability to education, substantial disparities be-
tween racial groups in schools will be treated as legal wrongs that
must be remedied.233 “While opponents of equal educational funding
argue that crime, poverty, complacency and the inability to educate
poor minorities are the causes of inferior education, . . . [it is] actually
the result of an inferior education.”234 A person’s level of education
directly impacts her economic potential.235 “[B]y providing better ed-
ucational opportunities to children with wealthier parents and neigh-
bors,” the public school funding system is inhibiting the upward
mobility of minority children in Chicago.236 Minority children from
disadvantaged communities already have to overcome internal com-
plexes that they are inferior to their white counterparts.237 Improving
the quality of education is necessary to address the social realities of
higher crime rates, higher unemployment rates, racism, and the ab-
sence of positive role models.238 Teachers with lower wages usually
have less experience and are more predominant in communities of
color and poverty.239 These teachers tend to blame poor performance
on the students instead of communicating a clear purpose and voicing
high expectations, which have been shown to be essential for high ed-
ucational achievement.240 Education clearly affects poverty and cre-
ates a cycle that minority children cannot escape.
The system under which Illinois currently operates rewards those
who need it the least and dismisses those who live in poor areas, sug-
gesting that the only way out is to relocate. This ultimately under-
mines the idea that education operates as an equalizer.241 Students
attending schools in high poverty neighborhoods tend to confront
more issues with school environment including absenteeism, truancy,
and bullying.242 Approximately 25% of students in CPS live in pov-
erty, while approximately 15% of students from other Illinois school
233. Piche´ et al., supra note 222, at 16. R
234. Watson, supra note 3, at 402. R
235. Id. at 403.
236. Id. at 404.
237. See id. at 405.
238. Id.
239. See generally Douglas Gagnon & Marybeth J. Mattingly, Beginning Teachers Are More
Common in Rural, High-Poverty, and Racially Diverse Schools, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 53 (Carsey
Inst., Durham, N.H.), Summer 2012.
240. Watson, supra note 3, at 405. R
241. Sean Slade, Poverty Affects Education—And Our Systems Perpetuate It, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 24, 2016, 3:23 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/sean-slade/poverty-affects-
education_b_7861778.html.
242. Id.
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districts live in poverty.243 These students also tend to go hungry, and
at some point having an inadequate supply of food throughout the
school year can lead to attention and behavioral problems.244 The
stress of living in poverty affects children’s ability to memorize and
learn.245 Statistically, children who are living in poverty, which is a
large portion of the students in CPS, are at a greater risk for poor
academic achievement and dropping out.246 This academic achieve-
ment gap is more pronounced in Black and Hispanic students due to
the underfunding of public schools districts like CPS.247 This achieve-
ment gap sprouts from the fewer resources in CPS because it offers
fewer IB/AP programs and special enrollment opportunities. Inade-
quate education funding leads to low-quality education that reinforces
a cycle of poverty.248
These education disparities maintain a cycle of poverty that is al-
ready intrinsically tied with race. Even though white Americans make
up the largest group of Americans living in poverty, minorities are
statistically overrepresented.249 For example, in the United States,
27% of all Blacks and 26% of all Hispanics live in poverty, in compar-
ison to 10% of white Americans.250 The cycle continues when you
look at incarceration rates. The government invests a lot of money in
jail systems. This can be interpreted as a tradeoff to funding public
education.251 Some of these detainees are streamlined from some of
these poorly funded schools. Studies show that the lack of funding in
these schools leads to underqualified teachers, which ultimately leads
to delinquency, drop outs, and eventual criminal behavior.252
243. SAIPE School District Estimates for 2016, CENSUS.GOV (2017), https://www2.census
.gov/programs-surveys/saipe/datasets/2016/2016-school-districts/sd16-il.txt (select “Illinois”
hyperlink).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Effects of Poverty, Hunger and Homelessness on Children and Youth, supra note 4 R
(“The National Center for Education Statistics reports that in 2008, the dropout rate of students
living in low-income families was about four and one-half times greater than the rate of children
from higher-income families (8.7 percent versus 2.0 percent).”).
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Steven Hawkins, Education vs. Incarceration, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 6, 2010), http://pros-
pect.org/article/education-vs-incarceration (“With tens of billions of dollars in prison spending
annually, states are finding that there is simply less discretionary money available to invest in
education . . . .”).
252. See Caitlin Curley, School Funding: How a Broken System Deepens the School-to-Prison
Pipeline, GENFKD (July 19, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.genfkd.org/school-funding-broken-sys
tem-deepens-school-prison-pipeline.
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In 2017, the graduation rate for CPS was 75.6%253 in comparison to
the rest of Illinois, wherein the graduation rate was 87%.254 However,
one in every three Black male students at CPS drop out, and this typi-
cally leads to imprisonment.255 Though beyond the scope of this Note,
issues of incarceration and race are perpetuated by low-quality educa-
tion and drive the cycle of poverty. Even Governor Rauner himself
referred to schools in CPS as “basically almost crumbling prisons” due
to the broken formula of school funding.256 This broken formula leads
these same students to prison, when they could be in classes. The ac-
tual cost of imprisoning students is more than equipping them with an
equal education.257 In Chicago, 56.2% of the prison population of the
Illinois Department of Corrections are Black,258 while only 14.6% of
Chicago residents are Black.259 These numbers can be seen as results
of the inadequate public school funding litigation that perpetuates
these discrepancies.
The change in school funding starts with changing how courts liti-
gate public school funding issues under the disparate impact analysis.
Public school funding litigation must be reformed to liberate minority
children from discrimination and “adequate” education. This reform
of public school litigation will create equal outcomes and opportuni-
ties regardless of race. Courts should begin to evaluate these public
funding issues on the basis of a disparate impact claim, thus balancing
the starkness of the impact versus the nondiscriminatory reason prof-
fered by the defendants. It is long past time for the judiciary to alter
253. Greg Hinz, CPS Graduation Rate Hits New High, but a Third of Black Males Still Drop
Out, CHI. BUS. (Sept. 4, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/greg-hinz-politics/cps-
graduation-rate-hits-new-high-third-black-males-still-drop-out.
254. Corina Curry, Area High Schools See Graduation Rates Go Up, RRSTAR.COM (Nov. 4,
2017, 11:58 PM), https://www.rrstar.com/news/20171103/area-high-schools-see-graduation-rates-
go-up.
255. See Hinz, supra note 253 (“[M]ore than a third of black males still are dropping out, an R
action that severely limits career opportunities and often is a precursor to criminal and other
negative activity.”).
256. Tom Schuba, Rauner Compares Some CPS Schools to ‘Crumbling Prisons’, NBC CHI.
(June 6, 2016, 6:01 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/Rauner-Compares-
Some-CPS-Schools-to-Crumbling-Prisons-382008031.html.
257. In 2013, a study showed “Cook County spent $600 a day to detain a youth at the Juvenile
Temporary Detention Center,” while it only “cost[s] $75 a day to educate a student in Chicago
Public Schools . . . .” Project NIA, Chicago School-to-Prison Pipeline Fact Sheet, CHI. YOUTH
JUST. (Sept. 2013), https://chiyouthjustice.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/chicago-school-to-prison-
updated-9-13-w-lgbt.pdf.
258. Dede Short, Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Report, ILLINOIS.GOV 79
(July 2018), https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/reportsandstatistics/Documents/FY2017%20IDOC
%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
259. QuickFacts: Illinois, CENSUS.GOV, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/il (last visited Apr.
14, 2019).
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the analysis for underfunding in education and overrule the argument
that an adequate education is all that our country owes to its children.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note evaluates the decision in Rauner to not interfere or dis-
rupt the current public school funding in CPS schools because of its
insufficient application of a disparate impact analysis. This Note ar-
gues that the burden-shifting analysis should be replaced by balancing
the starkness of the impact of a discriminatory policy with the justifi-
cation articulated by the defendants in all public school funding litiga-
tion cases. Courts should be active in public school funding cases
because it is their responsibility to take a stance when a group of peo-
ple are being continually marginalized absent justifications. Courts
should also take an active role in public funding litigation because sev-
eral statutes like ICRA share ambiguous language governing the level
of education required for all.
The standard that has been applied to public school funding litiga-
tion is not effectively insulating minority children from discrimination
and must be altered. Public school funding litigation reform is neces-
sary to remedy this stagnancy. The vicious cycle between inferior edu-
cation and poverty should be remedied by public school funding; it
should not be perpetuating it. Poverty coincides with low-quality edu-
cation in every way, but high-quality education will ultimately sanc-
tion that all students regardless of race have the opportunity to
succeed. By remaining silent bystanders, as an ancient and sometimes
selective disparate impact standard continues to place minority chil-
dren in a never-ending cycle of poverty, the Chicago courts are ensur-
ing that minority children never receive a pencil.
Ashlee Germany
